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“When the legislative and executive powwers are united in the same
person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty.” –
Charles de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu1
I. INTRODUCTION
Under the United States Constitution (“Constitution”), Congress has
the power to create laws2 and holds the power of the purse,3 while the
President ensures that the laws are faithfully executed.4 The separation
of powers is something that American schoolchildren are taught from a
young age; Congress passes laws and funds the agencies, and
departments of the executive branch implement and enforce those laws.
The judiciary has also illustrated the division of power between the
executive and legislative branches of government.5 However, while this
division seems straightforward, Congress has slowly increased its control
over the activities of the executive branch through directly influencing
administrative proceedings and through the use of substantive policy
riders in the appropriation process.6 In fact, since the 1870s, Congress
has attached policy riders to appropriation bills.7
1

CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS (1748),
http://sourcebooks.fordham. edu/mod/montesquieu-spirit.asp.
2
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (Congress shall have the power to “make all Laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers.”).
3
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 (“No money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in
Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.”).
4
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (The President “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed”).
5
Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 202 (1928) (“Legislative power, as
distinguished from executive power, is the authority to make laws, but not to enforce them”);
J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928) (Congress may not
“invest itself or its Members with either executive power or judicial power.”).
6
Neal E. Devins, Regulation of Government Agencies Through Limitation Riders, 1987
DUKE L.J. 456, 462 (1987).
7
Id. (“By the 1940s, the use of riders was so widespread that the Joint Committee on
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This Article investigates the legality and utility of Congressional
interference in the administrative process. Part II discusses direct
Congressional interference in agency decision-making. Part III examines
the use of substantive appropriations riders to effectuate policy change.
Part IV argues that substantive limitations placed on administrative
agencies in the appropriations process are unconstitutional. Part V
discusses how, regardless of the constitutionality, limitation policy riders
are not an effective policymaking vehicle. Part VI provides case studies
illustrating how current legislation possibly violates multiple clauses of
the Constitution. Part VII offers solutions to address the problems arising
from the use of policy riders in the appropriation process. From the
outset, it is important to note that Congress has the constitutional ability
to alter agency policy by simply passing a statute;8 however, this Article
focuses on Congressional interference through other means. Part VIII
concludes.
II. CONGRESSIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH AGENCY DECISION-MAKING
Currently, no federal law or internal rule prohibits a Member of
Congress (“Member”) in the Senate or House of Representatives
(“House”) from becoming involved in matters before a federal
administrative agency, even to the extent of contacting, discussing with,
and representing the interests of his or her constituents before an agency.
However, the Senate and the House have internal rules that govern how
Members interact with administrative agencies.
A. Congressional Rules and Guidance
On January 26, 1970, the House Committee on Standards of Official
Conduct issued Advisory Opinion No. 1 (“Advisory Opinion”) to provide
guidance for Representatives when interacting with federal
administrative agencies.9
The Advisory Opinion permits a
Representative to communicate with an administrative agency on any
matter to:
Request information or a status report; urge prompt
consideration; arrange for interviews or appointments;
express judgment; call for reconsideration of an
administrative response which he believes is not supported by
established law, Federal regulation or legislative intent;
perform any other service of a similar nature in this area
the Organization of Congress recommended that the practice of attaching legislation to
appropriations bills be discontinued.”).
8
Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch.) 87 (1810) (“The courts will not overturn the
action of a legislature because of the impure motives of certain of its members.”).
9
3 Lewis Deschler, Deschler’s Precedents of the U.S. House of Representatives, ch. 12,
Appendix (1970) [hereinafter Deschler’s Precedents].
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compatible with the
criteria hereinafter expressed in this
Advisory Opinion.10
Additionally, the Advisory Opinion requires Representatives to
uphold a standard of conduct. Specifically, Representatives must treat all
constituents equally, pursue issues diligently irrespective of political or
other considerations, and avoid any suggestion of either favoritism or
reprisal to action taken by an agency.11
On the other hand, the Standing Rules of the Senate, Rule XLIII
provides guidance for Senators when interacting with federal
administrative agencies.12 Rule XLIII allows Senators to “assist
constituents before federal administrative agencies by requesting
information or a status report; urging prompt consideration of a matter;
arranging for interviews or appointments; expressing judgments; or
calling for reconsideration of an administrative response which the
Member believes is not reasonably supported by statutes, regulations or
considerations of public policy.”13 Senators are prohibited from
advocating on behalf of constituents on the basis of contributions or
services or on the promise of contributions or services.14
B. Judicial Standards
Judicial precedent can provide guidance to Members and the general
public with respect to the nature and extent of allowable congressional
intervention into agency adjudication and rulemaking. Under the
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), administrative action generally
falls into two categories: adjudication or rulemaking.15 Under the APA,
adjudication is the “agency process for the formulation of an order.”16
Whereas, rulemaking is the “agency process for formulating, amending,
or repealing a rule.”17
Adjudication and rulemaking can be either formal or informal.
Formal adjudication arises in “every case of adjudication required by
statute to be determined on the record after opportunity for an agency
hearing.”18 Informal adjudications are not accompanied by the
protections of a judicial-like trial; importantly, the APA makes no

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

Id.
Id.
Standing Rules of the Senate, S. DOC. NO. 104-1, 102th Cong., 2nd Sess., § 43 (1992).
Id.
Id.
5 U.S.C. § 551 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-90).
§ 551(7).
§ 551(13).
§ 554(a).
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provision for informal adjudications.19 Informal rulemaking requires the
administrative agency to publish a proposed rule in the Federal Register
and provide “interested persons” an opportunity to participate in the
rulemaking.20 Formal rulemaking must include a trial-type hearing at
which a “party is entitled to present his case or defense or oral or
documentary evidence, to submit rebuttal evidence, and to conduct such
cross-examination as may be required for a full and true disclosure of the
facts.”21
According to the Attorney General’s Manual on the Administrative
Act, a rulemaking proceeding is the “implementation or prescription of
law or policy for the future, rather than the evaluation of a respondent’s
past conduct . . . [c]onversely, adjudication is concerned with the
determination of past and present rights and liabilities.” 22 Because the
purpose and focus of these administrative actions are dissimilar, Congress
has imposed vastly different statutory procedural requirements.
Courts have analyzed congressional intervention with respect to
both adjudicatory actions and rulemaking actions; these issues will be
discussed separately below.
i. Adjudicatory Actions
In Pillsbury Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n,23 the Senate Subcommittee
on Antitrust and Monopoly held a hearing with the Federal Trade
Commission (“FTC”) Chairman on a key issue in an antitrust
adjudication involving the Pillsbury Company which was pending before
the FTC.24 During the hearing, multiple Senators, including the
Committee Chair, criticized the FTC for its interpretation of the Clayton
Act in a previous interlocutory order in Pillsbury’s favor. 25 Subsequent
to the hearing, in its final order, the FTC ruled against Pillsbury, as the
Committee had suggested.26 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
held that the divestiture order was invalid because the FTC’s decisional
process had been tainted by impermissible congressional influence.27
Aircraft Owners and Pilots Ass’n. v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 600 F.2d 965, 970 (D.C.
Cir. 1979) (“Unlike formal adjudication . . . the process did not involve trial-type, adversarial
hearings.”).
20
§ 553(c).
21
5 U.S.C. § 553(d).
22
U.S. Dep’t, of Justice, Attorney General’s Manual on the Administrative Procedure
Act 14 (1947).
23
Pillsbury Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 354 F.2d 952, 952 (5th Cir. 1966).
24
Id. at 953.
25
Id. at 956-63.
26
Id. at 956.
27
Id. at 963.
19
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Specifically, the Fifth Circuit held the Senate hearing was an “improper
intrusion into the adjudicatory process of the [FTC].”28
The Fifth Circuit reasoned that “[t]o subject an administrator to a
searching examination as to how and why he reached his decision in a
case still pending before him, and to criticize him for reaching the
‘wrong’ decision, as the Senate subcommittee did in this case, sacrifices
the appearance of impartiality.” 29 The Fifth Circuit concluded that it
could “preserve the rights of the litigants in a case such as this without
having any adverse effect upon the legitimate exercise of the investigative
power of Congress. What we do is to preserve the integrity of the judicial
aspect of the administrative process.”30
In Koniag v. Andrus,31 the House Subcommittee on Fisheries and
Wildlife Conservation held a hearing where the Chair, Representative
Dingell, voiced his displeasure with some of the initial Bureau of Indian
Affairs (“BIA”) eligibility determinations for several communities to
receive land and money under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act
(“ANCSA”).32 The D.C. Circuit Court held the Pillsbury decision was
not applicable because none of the individuals called before the
subcommittee was a decision-maker in the eligibility determinations and
concluded that the hearing did not raise the appearance of impropriety.33
The D.C. Circuit found that a letter sent by Representative Dingell
to the Secretary of the Interior, only two days before he determined that
a number of the villages were ineligible for Federal grants, did raise the
appearance of impropriety. Representative Dingell’s letter requested that
the Secretary of the Interior postpone his decisions on the ANCSA claims
because “testimony [at the hearings] that village eligibility and Native
enrollment requirements of ANCSA have been misinterpreted in the
regulations and that certain villages should not have been certified as
eligible for land selections under ANCSA.”34 The D.C. Circuit held that
while the letter did not specify any particular villages, it compromised the
appearance of the Secretary of the Interior’s impartiality.35
In Peter Kiewit Sons’ Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,36 Peter
Pillsbury Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 354 F.2d 952, 963 (5th Cir. 1966).
Id. at 964.
30
Id.
31
Koniag v. Andrus, 580 F.2d 601, 601 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1052
(1978).
32
Id. at 612.
33
Id. at 610.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Peter Kiewit Sons’ Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 714 F.2d 163, 163 (D.C. Cir.
1983).
28
29
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Kiewit Sons’ construction company was convicted of a Sherman Act
violation. Consequently, the Army Corps of Engineers, Department of
the Army, and the Department of Defense, instituted debarment
proceedings against the construction company. 37 During an Armed
Services Committee hearing, Senator Carl Levin questioned government
officials about whether and why the Army Corps of Engineers had
continued doing business with Peter Kiewit Sons’ construction
company.38 Senator Levin also wrote a letter inquiring about the status
of the debarment proceedings and met with top Army officials concerning
the case.39
The D.C. Circuit reasoned that a judicial or quasi-judicial
proceeding could be invalidated by the appearance of bias or pressure and
that “pressure on the decisionmaker alone, without proof or effect on the
outcome, is sufficient to vacate a decision.”40 Moreover, the D.C. Circuit
stated “[t]he test is whether ‘extraneous factors intruded into the calculus
of consideration’ of the individual decisionmaker.”41 The D.C. Circuit
ultimately held there was no actual nor apparent congressional
interference since Senator Levin never communicated directly with the
ultimate decisionmaker in the debarment proceedings, nor was it shown
that that official was even aware of the Senator Levin’s
communications.42
In Power Auth. of N.Y. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n,43 the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”), issued a number of
decisions concerning the allocation of inexpensive hydroelectric power
from the Niagara Power Project.44 The plaintiffs in the case argued that
four Members of Congress allegedly engaged in ex parte
communications with FERC in connection with the proceedings. The
communications consisted of a letter from two Members of Congress
from New York: Representative Jack Kemp and Representative Barber
Conable to President Ronald Reagan. President Reagan forwarded the
Kemp/Conable letter to the Chairman of FERC, C.M. Butler III. During
37

Id. at 163.
Id. at 167.
39
Id. at 166.
40
Id. at 169.
41
Peter Kiewit Sons’ Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 714 F.2d 163, 170 (D.C. Cir.
1983) (emphasis in original) (quoting D. C. Federation of Civic Ass’ns v. Volpe, 459 F.2d
1231, 1246 (D.C. Cir. 1971)).
42
Id.
43
Power Auth. of N.Y. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n., 743 F.2d 93, 93 (2d Cir.
1984).
44
Id. at 98 (“The project can be traced back to 1950, when the United States and Canada
signed a treaty providing for expanded use of the Niagara River for hydropower generation.”).
38
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a press conference attended by the four defendants, FERC officials and
the public, the Legal Advisor to Chairman Butler read part of Chairman
Butler’s reply to the Kemp/Conable letter, which was then followed by
criticism of FERC’s decision by several Members of Congress. 45
The Second Circuit empathized with the plaintiffs and reasoned that
“[e]x parte communications by Congressmen or anyone else with a
judicial or quasi-judicial body regarding a pending matter are improper
and should be discouraged.”46 However, the Second Circuit found that
the mere existence of such communications does not require a court or
administrative body to disqualify itself and that in this case, the plaintiffs
were promptly made aware of the Kemp/Conable letter and had a full
opportunity to comment and respond.47
ii. Non-Adjudicatory Actions
Courts have addressed claims of undue congressional influence
which are outside the context of a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding.
In D.C. Fed’n of Civic Ass’ns v. Volpe, the plaintiffs argued that a
decision to approve construction of the Three Sisters Bridge across the
Potomac River by the Secretary of Transportation was tainted by
extraneous pressure.48 Representative Bill Natcher, Chairman of the
Subcommittee on the District of Columbia Appropriations had
jurisdiction over the funding of the District of Columbia’s transportation
construction projects. Plaintiffs alleged that Representative Natcher
threatened to deny funds for the District of Columbia’s proposed subway
system unless the Three Sisters Bridge project was approved and that
those threats had a legal impact on the Secretary of Transportation’s
subsequent approval decision.49
The D.C. Circuit reasoned that the impact of the threat was
sufficient, standing alone, to invalidate the Secretary of Transportation’s
action and held that “[e]ven if the Secretary had taken every formal step
required by every applicable statutory provision, reversal would be
required . . . because extraneous pressure intruded into the calculus of
considerations on which the Secretary’s decision was based.”50
The D.C. Circuit opined that:
the underlying problem cannot be illuminated by a simplistic
effort to force the Secretary’s action into a purely judicial or
45

Id. at 109.
Id. at 110.
47
Id.
48
D.C. Fed’n of Civic Ass’ns v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 1231, 1235 (1971), cert. denied 405
U.S. 1030 (1972).
49
Id. at 1236-37.
50
Id. at 1245-46.
46
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purely legislative mold. His decision was not “judicial” in
that he was not required to base it solely on a formal record
established at a public hearing. At the same time, it was not
purely “legislative” since Congress had already established
the boundaries within which his discretion could operate. But
even though his action fell between these two conceptual
extremes, it is still governed by principles that we had thought
elementary and beyond dispute. If, in the course of reaching
his decision, Secretary Volpe took into account
“considerations that Congress could not have intended to
make relevant,” his action proceeded from an erroneous
premise and his decision cannot stand. The error would be
more flagrant, of course, if the Secretary had based his
decision solely on the pressures generated by Representative
Natcher. But it should be clear that his action would not be
immunized
merely because he also considered some relevant
factors.51
The D.C. Circuit’s decision illustrates the difficult issues arising from
judicial review of congressional interference in agency decisions, some
of which are adjudicatory and some of which are legislative.
iii. Rulemaking Actions
In Sierra Club v. Costle,52 the Environmental Protection Agency
(“EPA”) engaged in an informal rulemaking to update its source pollution
standards (“NSPS”) mandated by the Clean Air Act.53 Plaintiffs argued,
among other things, that the EPA engaged in post-comment meetings and
received ex parte communications from Members of Congress that had
caused the EPA to withdraw its support of a more stringent emission
standard and was therefore unlawful and prejudicial.54
The D.C. Circuit held that if Congress wanted to forbid or limit ex
parte contact in cases of informal rulemaking, it would have done so.55
The Court reasoned that where
agency action resembles judicial action, where it involves
formal rulemaking, adjudication, or quasi-adjudication
among ‘conflicting private claims to a valuable privilege,’ the
insulation of the decisionmaker from ex parte contacts is
justified by basic notions of due process to the parties
involved. But where agency action involves informal
rulemaking of a policymaking sort, the56concept of ex parte
contacts is of more questionable utility.
The Court further reasoned that “a judicially imposed blanket
51

Id. at 1247-48.
Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 298 (1981).
53
Id. See 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(6) (Westlaw current through Pub. L. No. 115-90).
54
Sierra Club, 657 F.2d at 386-87 (finding the plaintiff objected to multiple meetings
held with then Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd).
55
Id. at 401.
56
Id. at 400.
52
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requirement that all post-comment period oral communications be
docketed would . . . contravene our limited powers of review, would stifle
desirable experimentation in the area by Congress and the agencies, and
is unnecessary for achieving the goal of an established, procedure-defined
docket.”57
The Court held that it was entirely proper for Members of Congress
to represent the interests of their constituents before administrative
agencies engaged in informal, general policy rulemaking and that before
an administrative rulemaking could be overturned simply on the grounds
of political pressure, it had to be shown that “the content of the pressure
on the [decisionmaker] is designed to force him to decide upon factors
not made relevant by Congress in the applicable statute” and also that the
determination made “must be affected by those extraneous
considerations.”58
Courts have used the Sierra Club test to determine when political
pressure will invalidate an agency rulemaking. However, this is a high
bar to meet. For example, in Ctr. for Sci. in Pub. Interest v. Dep’t of
Treasury,59 the D.C. District Court stated that “[p]laintiffs cite no case,
and we know of none, in which an agency decision was invalidated
because the agency had received letters from congressmen arguing for a
certain outcome.”60 In Orangetown v. Ruckelshaus, the Southern District
of New York held that “to state a cause of action for improper political
influence on an administrative agency,” there must be some “factual basis
for a claim that: (1) the content of the pressure on the agency was
designed to force it to decide upon factors not made relevant by Congress
in the applicable statute; and (2) the agency’s determination must have
been affected by those extraneous considerations.”61
C. Congressional Review Act
The Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) allows Congress to
review actions taken by administrative agencies. The Congressional
Review Act (“CRA”) requires the Government Accountability Office
(“GAO”) to report to Congress on whether an agency, in promulgating a
major rule, has complied with the regulatory process. Under Section 801
of the APA, “[b]efore a rule can take effect, the Federal agency
57
58
59

Id. at 403.
Id. at 409-10.
Ctr. for Sci. in Pub. Interest v. Dep’t of Treasury, 573 F. Supp. 1168, 1168 (D.D.C.

1983).
60

Id. at 1179.
Orangetown v. Ruckelshaus, 579 F. Supp. 15, 20 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (citing Sierra Club,
657 F.2d at 409).
61
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promulgating such rule shall submit to each House of the Congress and
to the Comptroller General a report containing: (i) a copy of the rule; (ii)
a concise general statement relating to the rule, including whether it is a
major rule; and (iii) the proposed effective date of the rule.”62 The
submission shall include: a cost-benefit analysis (if one was prepared),
the agency’s actions relevant to the Regulatory Flexibility Act, the
agency’s actions relevant to the Unfunded Mandate Reform Act and “any
other relevant information or requirements under any other Act and any
relevant Executive orders.”63 GAO’s report must be made to each house
of Congress no later than 15 calendar days after a rule’s submission or
publication date.64
The CRA established expedited (“fast track”) procedures by which
Congress may disapprove a broad range of regulatory rules issued by
federal agencies by enacting a joint resolution of disapproval. 65 Under
Section 801, “[a] rule shall not take effect (or continue), if the Congress
enacts a joint resolution of disapproval, described under section 802.”66
Under Section 802, Congress can pass a joint resolution stating that
“‘Congress disapproves the rule submitted by the ——— relating to —
——, and such rule shall have no force or effect’ (The blank spaces being
appropriately filled in).”67 Importantly, if a rule is disapproved after
going into effect, it is “treated as though [it] had never taken effect.”
Furthermore, another very important point in the context of a fiduciary
rule is that if a disapproval resolution is enacted, the rule may not take
effect and the agency may issue no substantially similar rule without
subsequent statutory authorization.68
The disapproval process under the CRA begins when a Member of
Congress, House or Senate, submits a joint resolution of disapproval. The
joint resolution is referred to the House and Senate committee with
jurisdiction.69 The Congressional Research Service provides a useful
illustration of the varying outcomes of CRA review:70
62

5 U.S.C. § 801(a)(1)(A) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-90).
§ 801(a)(1)(B)(i)-(iv).
64
§ 801(a)(2)(A).
65
RICHARD BETH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31160, DISAPPROVAL OF REGULATIONS BY
CONGRESS: PROCEDURE UNDER THE CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT 1 (2001).
66
§ 801(b)(2) (“A rule that does not take effect (or does not continue) under paragraph
(1) may not be reissued in substantially the same form, and a new rule that is substantially the
same as such a rule may not be issued, unless the reissued or new rule is specifically
authorized by a law enacted after the date of the joint resolution disapproving the original
rule.”).
67
§ 802(a).
68
§ 801(b).
69
Id.
70
RICHARD BETH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31160, DISAPPROVAL OF REGULATIONS BY
63
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No Congressional Action. If neither house of Congress acts
on a disapproval resolution during the original waiting
period, the rule takes effect when that period expires (or later,
if so provided in accordance with the Administrative
Procedure Act or the terms of the rule itself).
Rejection by Either House. If either house votes to reject the
disapproval resolution, the action presumably ensures that no
disapproval resolution will pass both chambers. At that point
the waiting period is vitiated, and the rule may take effect
immediately (or later, if so required by the Administrative
Procedure Act or the rule itself).
Passage by Both Houses; No Veto. If both houses pass the
disapproval resolution and the President does not veto it, the
resolution becomes law, and the rule becomes “of no force
and effect” (whether or not the waiting period has expired).
Passage; Veto; No Attempt to Override. If both houses pass
the disapproval resolution and the President vetoes it, the
receipt by Congress of the veto message triggers the new
waiting period of 30 days of session. If a vote on overriding
the veto occurs in neither house, or in only one house, during
this new waiting period, the rule takes effect when the 30 days
of session expire (or later, if so required by other authorities).
Passage; Veto Sustained by Either House. If either house
votes to sustain the veto, Congress can no longer override. At
that point the additional 30-day waiting period is vitiated, and
the rule may take effect immediately (or later, if so required
by other authorities).
Passage; Veto Overridden. If both houses override the veto,
the disapproval resolution becomes
law, so that the rule
becomes “of no force and effect.”71
It is important to note that “the [CRA] provides no expedited
procedure for overriding a veto. Consideration of veto messages is
generally considered privileged in both chambers pursuant to the
requirements of the Constitution. The procedures of neither house,
however, require a vote on whether to override. In the Senate, an attempt
to reach such a vote might be delayed or blocked by filibuster. In other
respects, the normal procedures of each house probably would suffice to
allow a majority that wished an override vote to secure one.”72
However, even though Congress has this power of review, it is rarely
used. In 2006, the GAO found from 1996 to 2006, Members of Congress
introduced only thirty-seven CRA disapproval resolutions, and only one
of those was ultimately approved.73 This number is infinitesimal (less
than one percent) compared to the total number of rules proposed by
agencies in that same time period, which the GAO reported as 41,828
CONGRESS: PROCEDURE UNDER THE CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT 8-9 (2001).
71
Id.
72
Id. at 14.
73
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-601T, PERSPECTIVES ON 10 YEARS OF
CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT IMPLEMENTATION, 1, 3 (2006).
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major and non-major rules.74
III. EFFECTUATING POLICY CHANGE THROUGH SUBSTANTIVE
APPROPRIATIONS RIDERS
Congress’ power of the purse is a powerful tool and the
appropriations process is “one of the most important authorities allocated
to Congress.”75 Courts have stated that “constitutional structure would
collapse, and the role of the House would be meaningless, if the
Executive could circumvent the appropriations process and spend funds
however it pleases.”76 However, while Congress holds the purse strings,
it cannot intrude on the Executive’s authority of enforcing laws.77
Therefore, it is important to note that this Article focuses on substantive
limitations placed on executive agencies in the appropriations process,
rather than constitutionally-acceptable funding decisions made by
Congress.78
A. Congressional Rules and Guidance
The Senate and House have internal rules that encourage the
separation of money and policy decisions. Specifically, legislating
through appropriations riders violates Senate and House rules—
legislative provisions typically may not be included in appropriations
measures.79 It is important to note that these rules only apply to general
appropriations bills,80 they do not apply to continuing resolutions.81
In the House, House Rule XXI prohibits legislative provisions from
74

Id. at 4.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 58 (James Madison) (“This power over the purse may, in fact,
be regarded as the most complete and effectual weapon with which any constitution can arm
the immediate representatives of the people”).
76
United States House of Representatives v. Burwell, 130 F.Supp.3d 53, 73 (D.D.C.
2015).
77
U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 1-2.
78
These would be limitations that restrict the amount or availability of funds without
changing the existing law.
79
Deschler’s Precedents, vol. 8, chapter 26, § 24 (“Generally, language in an
appropriation bill proposing to repeal existing law is legislation and not in order. Similarly,
an amendment in the form of a limitation but construing or interpreting existing law is
legislation and not in order on an appropriation bill.”).
80
JESSICA TOLLESTRUP, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE CONGRESSIONAL APPROPRIATIONS
PROCESS: AN INTRODUCTION 13 (2014) (“The appropriations process assumes the
consideration of 12 regular appropriations measures annually. Each House and Senate
appropriations subcommittee has jurisdiction over one regular bill”).
81
Id. at 14 (“Traditionally, continuing appropriations have been used to maintain
temporary funding for agencies and programs until the regular bills are enacted. Such
appropriations continuing funding are usually provided in a joint resolution, hence the term
continuing resolution (or CR)).
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being reported in general appropriation bills and amendments to
appropriation bills containing language that would alter existing laws are
also prohibited.82 Clause 5 of House Rule XXI also bars legislative
language in conference reports that accompany appropriations acts. 83 In
the Senate, Senate Rule XVI restricts legislative language not contained
within existing law from being added via amendment to a general
appropriations bill unless it is determined to be made to carry out the
provisions of some existing law.84 These rules are enforced on the House
and Senate floor by points of order.85 It is important to note that since
House and Senate rules are not self-enforcing, a point of order must be
made against a legislative provisions, and without this action, the
provision could be considered and adopted.86
Members of Congress, while being subject to these restrictions on
the use of legislative language in appropriations bills, have procedures to
circumvent these rules. First, the House may “grant unanimous consent
that points of order be waived against all of the provisions contained in
an appropriation bill.”87 Second, the House may “adopt a resolution
waiving points of order against a section of an appropriation bill which
contains legislative provisions in violation of Clause 2 of Rule XXI.” 88
IV. POLICY RIDERS IN APPROPRIATIONS MEASURES ARE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Under the Constitution, the President shall ensure that laws are
faithfully executed89 and the “executive Power shall be vested in a

82

Rules of the U.S. House of Representatives, H.R. DOC. NO 113-181, 113th Cong., 2nd
Sess. §§ 1034-35 (2015).
83
Id. at § 1064.
84
Standing Rules of the Senate, S. DOC. NO. 113-1, 113th Cong., 1st Sess., § 1 (2015).
85
JAMES V. SATURNO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., POINTS OF ORDER IN THE
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET PROCESS 1-2 (2015) (“Points of order are typically in the form of a
provision stating that “it shall not be in order” for the House or Senate to take a specified
action or consider certain legislation. When a point of order is sustained against consideration
of some matter, the effect is that the matter in question falls.”).
86
U.S. House of Reps. Comm. On Rules, Budget Act Points of Order Applicable in the
House of Representatives, available at http://archives.democrats.rules.house.gov/POP/
budget_points.htm (“Points of order are not self-enforcing, but rather are only brought into
play when a member raises a “point of order” against a specific Congressional action prior to
or during its consideration.”)
87
Deschler’s Precedents, vol. 8, chapter 26, § 3.1. (“Unanimous consent is “[a] proposal
that all members (of a chamber or committee) agree to set aside one or more chamber or
committee rules to take some action otherwise not in order. If any member objects to such a
request, it is not agreed to.”).
88
Deschler’s Precedents, vol. 8, chapter 26, § 3.2.
89
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
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President of the United States of America.”90 This power has been
affirmed since the beginning of our Democracy. For example, James
Madison stated that “if any power whatsoever is in its nature Executive,
it is the power of appointing, overseeing, and controlling those who
execute the laws.”91
For the legislative branch, the Constitution does not differentiate
Congress’ authority to appropriate funds from its other legislative
powers. However, this Article contends that while Congress has
authority to fund, or not to fund, the government, it has no authority to
direct administrative agencies’ execution of the law and that any action
by Congress in that respect would be unconstitutional. The Supreme
Court has held that “Congress can thereafter control the execution of [a
law’s] enactment only indirectly—by passing new legislation.”92 In
effect, Congress cannot direct the interpretation of laws it has passed
without amending the underlying statute. This is plain in the wording of
the Constitution, where it separates Congress’ authority to create law
from the executive branch’s ability to enforce it.93
A. Separation of Powers
It is important to note that courts have consistently upheld agencies’
power to carry out legislative policies embodied in federal statutes, i.e.,
create rules to implement statutory law. The Supreme Court has long
held that courts are not permitted “to probe the mental processes” of
administrators94 and that “the integrity of the administrative process must
be . . . respected.”95 In Myers v. United States96 the Supreme Court held
that “there may be duties of a quasi-judicial character imposed on
executive officers and members of executive tribunals whose decisions
after hearing affect interests of individuals.”97 In Humphrey’s Ex’r v.
United States,98 the Supreme Court held that:
Federal Trade Commission is an administrative body created
by Congress to carry into effect legislative policies embodied
in the statute in accordance with the legislative standard
90

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
1 ANNALS OF CONG. 463 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep. James
Madison) (emphasis added).
92
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 733 (1986).
93
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (Congress shall have the power to “make all Laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers.”) (emphasis
added).
94
Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 18 (1938).
95
Morgan v. United States, 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941).
96
Myers v. United States 272 U.S. 52, 52 (1926).
97
Id. at 135.
98
Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 602 (1935).
91
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therein prescribed, and to perform other specified duties as a
legislative or as a judicial aid . . . In administering the
provisions of the statute in respect of ‘unfair methods of
competition—that is to say in filling in and administering the
details embodied by that general standard—the commission
acts in part quasi-legislatively and in part quasi-judicially.99
Courts have consistently upheld agency rulemakings based upon a
delegation of authority from Congress. In Mistretta v. United States100,
the Supreme Court held that Congress could not do its job absent an
ability to delegate power to executive agencies.101 The Court deemed it
“constitutionally sufficient if Congress clearly delineates the general
policy, the public agency which is to apply it, and the boundaries of this
delegated authority.”102 In Northwest Forest Resource v. Pilchuck
Audubon Soc’y,103 the Ninth Circuit held that “[t]he power of the
Secretaries to administer the Congressionally created program
‘necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the making of rules to
fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress.’”104 This
delegation authority is even more powerful with respect to certain
agencies. For example, in Bob Jones University v. United States,105 the
Supreme Court held that “ever since the inception of the Tax Code,
Congress has seen fit to vest in those administering the tax laws very
broad authority to interpret those laws.”106
Courts have also repeatedly affirmed that Congress’ power is bound
by the Constitution. In Buckley v. Valeo,107 the Supreme Court held that
“Congress’ power. . .is inevitably bounded by the express language” of
the Constitution.108 In Loving v. United States,109 the Supreme Court held
that one branch of government could not “impair another in the
performance of its constitutional duties.”110 In INS v. Chadha,111 the
Supreme Court held that a one-house legislative veto was
unconstitutional because “each House of Congress retained the power to
reverse a decision Congress had expressly authorized the Attorney
99

Id. at 628.
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989).
101
Id.
102
Id. at 372-73.
103
Nw. Forest Res. v. Pilchuck Audubon Soc’y, 97 F.3d 1161, 1169 (1996).
104
Id. (quoting Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 843 (1984)).
105
Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 596 (1983).
106
Id.
107
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 138-39 (1976).
108
Id.
109
Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 757 (1996).
110
Id.
111
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 919 (1983).
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General to make.”112 The Court reasoned that:
[d]isagreement with the Attorney General’s decision on
Chadha’s deportation—that is, Congress’ decision to deport
Chadha—no less than Congress’ original choice to delegate
to the Attorney General the authority to make that decision,
involves determinations of policy that Congress can
implement in only one way; bicameral passage followed by
presentment to the President. Congress must abide by its
delegation of authority
until that delegation is legislatively
altered or revoked.113
In Fed. Election Comm’n v. NRA Political Victory Fund,114 the
Supreme Court held that while Congress may inform itself of how
legislation is being implemented through legislative oversight and
investigation, Congress is forbidden from intervening in the decision
making necessary to execute the law.115 In Bowsher v. Synar, the
Supreme Court held that “[t]he Constitution does not contemplate an
active role for Congress in the supervision of officers charged with the
execution of the laws it enacts.”116 The Supreme Court reasoned that:
to permit an officer controlled by Congress to execute the
laws would be, in essence, to permit a congressional veto.
Congress could simply remove, or threaten to remove, an
officer for executing the laws in any fashion found to be
unsatisfactory to Congress. This kind of congressional
control over the execution of the 117
laws, Chadha makes clear,
is constitutionally impermissible.
There is limited precedent that speaks directly to the constitutionality of
substantive policy riders in appropriations bills. In United States v.
Dickerson,118 the Supreme Court stated that there was no doubt that
Congress could use the appropriation process to amend an underlying
statute.119 In Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill,120 the Supreme Court
112

Id.
Id. at 954-55. See also Constitutionality of Congress’ Disapproval of Agency
Regulations by Resolutions Not Presented to the President, 4A OP. O.L.C. 21, 27 (1980)
(opinion of the Attorney General) (“[O]nce a function has been delegated to the executive
branch, it must be performed there, and cannot be subjected to continuing congressional
control except through the constitutional process of enacting new legislation.”).
114
Fed. Election Comm’n v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 6 F.3d 821, 827 (D.C. Cir.
1993), cert. dismissed, 513 U.S. 88 (1994)
115
Id. (citing Metropolitan Washington Airports Auth. v. Citizens for Abatement of
Aircraft Noise, Inc., 115 L. Ed. 2d 236, 236 (1991) (“The Court recalled that the Framers
recognized that ‘power is of an encroaching nature,’ The Federalist No. 48, at 332 (J.
Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961), and therefore the Constitution imposes a structural ban on
legislative intrusions into other governmental functions.”).
116
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 722 (1986).
117
Id. at 726.
118
United States v. Dickerson, 301 U.S. 554, 555 (1940).
119
Id.
120
Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 190 (1978).
113
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recognized
both substantive enactments and appropriations measures are
‘Acts of Congress,’ but the latter have the limited and specific
purpose of providing funds for authorized programs. When
voting on appropriations measures, legislators are entitled to
operate under the assumption that the funds will be devoted
to purposes which are lawful and not for any purpose
forbidden. Without such an assurance, every appropriations
measure would be pregnant with prospects of altering
substantive legislation, repealing by implication any prior
statute which might prohibit the expenditure. Not only would
this lead to the absurd result of requiring Members to review
exhaustively the background of every authorization before
voting on an appropriation, but it would flout the121
very rules
the Congress carefully adopted to avoid this need.
In Preterm v. Dukakis,122 a case looking at exclusive state financing of
abortions and the Medicaid Act, the First Circuit was “persuaded that
Congress realized that it was using the unusual and frowned upon device
of legislating via an appropriations measure to accomplish a substantive
result.”123 In Doe v. Busbee,124 the Northern District of Georgia found a
“recognized and settled policy of Congress against legislating in an
appropriations context.”125 In Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Salazar,126
the United States District Court for the District of Montana opined that
“[i]nserting environmental policy changes into appropriations bills may
be politically expedient, but it transgresses the process envisioned by the
Constitution by avoiding the very debate on issues of political importance
said to provide legitimacy.”127
In a contrary holding, in Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc’y,128 the
Supreme Court held that “although repeals by implication are especially
disfavored in the appropriations context, Congress nonetheless may
amend substantive law in an appropriations statute, as long as it does so
clearly.”129 However, with respect to administrative regulations that
implement statutory law, the Supreme Court has stated that “Congress
must abide by its delegation of authority until that delegation is altered or
revoked.”130 Importantly, the Supreme Court in Buckley affirmed that the
enforcement power of the executive branch includes the power to
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130

Id.
Preterm v. Dukakis, 591 F.2d 121, 131 (1st Cir. 1979).
Id.
Doe v. Busbee, 471 F. Supp. 1326, 1326 (N.D. Ga. 1979).
Id.
All. for the Wild Rockies v. Salazar, 800 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1125 (D. Mont. 2011).
Id.
Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 503 U.S. 429, 440 (1992) (citations omitted).
Id.
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 657 (1988).
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implement the law.131 In Bowsher, the Supreme Court held that
“[i]nterpreting a law enacted by Congress to implement the legislative
mandate is the very essence of ‘execution’ of the law.”132
This Article advocates that the approach taken by the courts in TVA,
Preterm, Doe, and Alliance is the correct approach, and it argues that
rather than using the appropriations process to amend an underlying
statute, Congress may have the authority to mandate a certain
interpretation of the statutory laws it has created. This factual situation
is distinguishable from Robertson, in which the Court found that
Congress was making changes in law, not findings or results under old
law, and would instead rely on Olson, which found that Congress’s
delegation stands until it is revoked, and Bowsher and Buckley, which
found that the executive’s authority to execute the law includes the power
to implement the law through regulation.
These cases illustrate that Congress potentially violates the
separation of powers under the Constitution when it directs executive and
independent agencies to interpret statutes in a certain way.
B. Presentment Clause
The use of substantive policy riders in the appropriations process
violates both the letter and the spirit of the Presentment Clause of the
Constitution.133 In TVA, the Supreme Court held that the use of
appropriation bills to make substantive changes in legislation would “lead
to the absurd result of requiring Congress to review exhaustively the
background of every authorization before voting on an appropriation.”134
In Clinton v. City of New York, the Supreme Court held that the use
of a “line item veto” by President Bill Clinton was unconstitutional.135
The Supreme Court reasoned that, among other things, if the line item
veto had been valid, then it would have authorized the President to create
a law whose text was not voted on by either house of Congress or

131

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 140-41 (1976).
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 733 (1986).
133
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (“Every bill which shall have passed the House of
Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a law, be presented to the President of
the United States; if he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his objections
to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the objections at large on their
journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after such reconsideration two thirds of that House
shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House,
by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that House, it
shall become a law”).
134
Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 190 (1978).
135
Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 449 (1998).
132
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presented to the President for signature.”136 This reasoning is important;
riders to appropriation bills undermine “deliberative lawmaking, which
requires legislators to (1) make explicit policy choices, (2) employ
procedures that limit arbitrary action, and (3) produce a record that is
subject to meaningful judicial review.”137 Substantive changes to
existing legislation through appropriation riders do not receive adequate
attention and are generally introduced late in the process, with little
debate.138
This Article contends that since the appropriation riders do not go
through the normally-required legislative procedures, often without
debate and obscured in voluminous budget documents, the riders would
authorize the President to create a law whose text was not subject to a
deliberative vote in Congress and a law that was not presented to the
President for his or her signature. In other words, the process removes
the President’s veto authority by attaching riders to must-pass spending
bills. As a result, this process violates the spirit, if not the letter, of the
Constitution and delegitimizes the legislative process.139
C. Due Process
Policy riders that force administrative action have the potential to
violate the due process clause of the Constitution. The Constitution states
that “[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.”140 The Supreme Court has reaffirmed that
“[c]ontract rights are a form of property and as such may be taken . . .
provided that just compensation is paid”141 and “[v]alid contracts are
property, whether the obligor be a private individual, a municipality, a
State, or the United States.”142 It is important to note that the Contracts
Clause of the Constitution would not be applicable, since it only applies
to states, not the federal government.143

136

Id. at 448.
Edward A. Fitzgerald, Alliance for Wild Rockies v. Salazar: Congress Behaving Badly,
25 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 351, 394 (2014).
138
Id. at 395.
139
See All. for the Wild Rockies, 800 F. Supp. 2d at1123.
140
U.S. CONST. art. V.
141
U.S. Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1977).
142
Lynch v. U.S., 292 U.S. 571, 579 (1934).
143
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 (“No State shall. . .pass any. . .Law impairing the Obligation
of Contracts.”). Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 733 (1984)
(“The Supreme Court has also stated that “we have contrasted the limitations imposed on
States by the Contract Clause with the less searching standards imposed on economic
legislation by the Due Process Clause”).
137
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The recent Department of Labor (“DOL”) “fiduciary”
rulemaking,144 is a notable example of how Congressional riders could
potentially violate the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. The DOL
rule requires firms and advisors to enter into “Best Interest Contracts”
(“BICs”) with their clients.145 This requirement becomes applicable on
January 1, 2018.146 If Congress uses a policy rider to delay or repeal the
DOL rule before this date, due process concerns will likely not arise.
However, Congress could act unconstitutionally by delaying or repealing
the rule after January 1, 2018.147
The Supreme Court has stated that “Congress has considerable
leeway to fashion economic legislation, including the power to affect
contractual commitments between private parties.”148 Additionally, it is
“well established that legislative Acts adjusting the burdens and benefits
of economic life come to the Court with a presumption of
constitutionality, and that the burden is on one complaining of a due
process violation to establish that the legislature has acted in an arbitrary
and irrational way.”149
In a landmark decision, Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States,150
the Supreme Court held the federal government had a broadly applicable
defense against takings actions based on interference with existing
private contracts. Specifically, the Supreme Court found that government
actions that only incidentally interfere with performance of private
contracts—rather than targeting them directly—constitute a “frustration,”
not a taking, of those contract rights.151
While the Omnia decision is broad, it does have its limitations. Most
importantly, Omnia does not apply when legislation expressly “targets”
an existing contract right—rather than affecting contract rights only

Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule-Retirement Investment
Advice, 81 Fed. Reg. 20946 (Apr. 8, 2016) (29 C.F.R. Pts. 2509, 2510, 2550); Best Interest
Contract Exemption, 81 Fed. Reg. 21002 (Apr. 8, 2016) (29 C.F.R. Pt. 2550).
145
Best Interest Contract Exemption; Correction, 81 Fed. Reg. 44773 (Jul. 11, 2016) (29
CFR Pt. 2550).
146
Best Interest Contract Exemption; Correction, 81 Fed. Reg. 44773 (Jul. 11, 2016) (29
CFR Pt. 2550).
147
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R. A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 730 (“It does not
follow . . . that what Congress can legislate prospectively it can legislate retrospectively. The
retroactive aspects of legislation, as well as the prospective aspects, must meet the test of due
process, and the justifications for the latter may not suffice for the former.”) (quoting Usery
v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1976)).
148
E. Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 528 (1998).
149
Concrete Pipe & Prods. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Tr., 508 U.S. 602, 637 (1993)
(quoting Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955)).
150
Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 502, 510 (1923).
151
Id. at 513.
144
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incidentally.152 In these cases, the Supreme Court uses the test described
in Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City.153 Accordingly, under
Penn Central Transp., courts apply the following test: (1) the economic
impact of the government action on the property owner; (2) the degree of
interference with the property owner’s investment-backed expectations;
and (3) the “character” of the government action.154
This Article contends that the use of a policy rider to delay or repeal
the DOL rule, after the January 1, 2018 applicability date, would violate
the Due Process Clause of the Constitution by specifically targeting the
BIC contracts entered into by advisors and their clients.
First, the action would directly target and nullify the BIC contracts.
In a Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs
report, Senator Ron Johnson cites experts and states that “[t]o take
advantage of the BIC exemption, the investor and advisor must sign a
contract acknowledging fiduciary status. The advisor must act in the best
interest of the client and must make numerous disclosures to the client
and to the Labor Department. Experts contend that the BIC exemption is
unworkable and will increase the cost of investment advice and services
and will, consequently, decrease access to investment services for small
investors.”155
In September 2015, during a hearing before the House
Subcommittee on Oversight of the Committee on Ways and Means,
Chairman Peter Roskam stated:
[u]nder the proposed fiduciary rule, commission-based plans
would be virtually eliminated. There is an exception if the
advisors and their clients enter into a so-called best-interest
contract, but this . . . creates a legal and financial liability for
investment advisors that will have serious consequences
on
access to competent and affordable financial advice.156
In the same hearing, Representative Joseph Crowley stated that he had
been informed that “there . . . [are] too many compliance burdens in the
Cienega Gardens v. United States, 331 F.3d 1319, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“Omnia
refers to legislation targeted at some public benefit, which incidentally affects contract rights,
not. . .legislation aimed at the contract rights themselves in order to nullify them.”).
153
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
154
Id. at 124.
155
Senator Ron Johnson, The Labor Department’s Fiduciary Rule: How a Flawed
Process Could Hurt Retirement Savers, A MAJORITY STAFF REPORT OF THE SENATE
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, Feb. 24, 2016, at 29,
available at https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/the-labor-departments-fiduciary-rulehow-a-flawed-process-could-hurt-retirement-savers.
156
Hearing on the Department of Labor’s Proposed Fiduciary Rule, Before the H.
Subcomm. on Oversight of the Committee on Ways and Means, 114th Cong. 5 (2015) (opening
statement by Chairman Peter Roskam), available at https://waysandmeans.house.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2016/10/20150930OS-Transcript.pdf.
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proposed BIC exemption.”157 In the April 2016 disapproval motion filed
by Congress under the CRA, Members of Congress contended that “[t]he
BIC exemption was widely panned as [] unworkable.”158
Based on these on the record statements, it will be difficult for
Members of Congress to fashion a policy rider that would repeal the DOL
rule without targeting the BIC contract. Once it is established that a
policy rider repealing the rule would target the BIC contracts, the Penn
Central test must be applied.
First, the economic impact on the property owners, specifically
holders of Individual Retirement Accounts (“IRA”) under the BIC, will
be enormous. Assets in IRAs totaled $7.8 trillion at the end of the third
quarter of 2016.159 In its Regulatory Impact Analysis (“RIA”), the DOL
found that the rule may result in a gain between $40 billion and $44
billion over 10 years for IRA investors.160
Second, the degree of interference is substantial. Repealing the rule
would effectively revert retirement investors’ back to their pre-enactment
financial position, where the DOL found that for mutual fund investments
in IRAs alone, investors would lose between $210 billion and $430
billion over 10 years, and between $500 billion and $1 trillion over 20
years as a result of conflicted advice. According to the DOL’s analysis,
an investor who moves money out of a 401(k) plan and into an IRA based
on conflicted advice can expect to lose twelve to twenty-four percent of
the value of his or her savings over 30 years.161
Third, Congress’s use of a policy rider in an appropriations bill to
repeal the DOL rule would be an arbitrary and irrational action. It is “well
established that . . . the burden is on one complaining of a due process
violation to establish that the legislature has acted in an arbitrary and
irrational way.”162 The DOL provided an exhaustive (almost 400-page)
impact analysis based upon a wealth of academic and empirical
evidence.163 For Congress to simply repeal the rule without providing a
157

Id. at 33.
Disapproving The Rule Submitted By The Department Of Labor Relating To The
Definition Of The Term “Fiduciary,” H.R.J. Res. 88, 114th Cong. (2016).
159
ICI, “Retirement Assets Total $25.0 Trillion in Third Quarter 2016,” available at
https://www.ici.org/ research/stats/retirement/ret_17_q3 (last visited Dec. 27, 2017).
160
U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Fiduciary Investment Advice: Regulatory Impact Analysis (Apr.
14, 2015), available at https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/laws-and-regulations/
rules-and-regulations/proposed-regulations/1210-AB32-2/conflictsofinterestria.pdf (last
visited Dec. 27, 2017).
161
Id.
162
Concrete Pipe & Prods. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Tr., 508 U.S. 602, 637 (1993)
(quoting Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955)).
163
U.S. Dep’t of Labor, supra note 160.
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comprehensive analysis of its own, illustrating why the rule should be
repealed, would be an arbitrary and irrational act.
Based on this analysis, while the courts grant considerable deference
to the legislature for due process cases, there is evidence that a repeal of
the DOL rule by a policy rider in an appropriation bill—which would
likely receive little, if any, debate, and would not be accompanied by any
type of empirical research supporting repeal—would effectively violate
the due process rights of IRA holders who have BIC contracts.
V. POLICY RIDERS ARE NOT AN EFFECTIVE POLICYMAKING VEHICLE
The use of substantive policy riders in the appropriations process is
an ineffective method to create policy for regulatory agencies.
A. Congressional Disapproval
While Congress routinely waives its rules to allow substantive
legislation to be attached to appropriation bills, Congress has consistently
warned against these measures. In 1946, the Joint Committee on the
Organization of Congress (“JCOC”) recommended that the practice of
attaching legislation to appropriation bills be discontinued.164 The JCOC
report stated:
[t]he practice of attaching legislation to appropriation bills is
often destructive of orderly procedure . . . Sometimes they
contradict action previously approved in carefully considered
legislation. In most cases such legislation is adopted under
the parliamentary guise of ‘limiting provisos,’ avoiding
points of order that would be raised against them165by
purporting to restrict the spending of Government funds.
The JCOC report went on to state that these practices, “when used for
purposes other than to effect real economies, should be prohibited by a
tightening of the rules” otherwise the “regular jurisdiction of the standing
committees . . . will continue to be impinged upon by the appropriating
committees. Much added work in Government departments and by
private attorneys is caused by attaching legislative riders on appropriation
bills.”166
B. Executive Disapproval
The executive branch, under both Republican and Democratic
administrations, has long worried about the unconstitutional
Congressional encroachment. In 1880, President Rutherford B. Hayes
stated, “I am firmly convinced that appropriation bills ought not to
164
165
166

S. REP. NO. 79-1011, at 23 (1946).
Id. at 23-24.
Id.
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contain any legislation not relevant to the application or expenditure of
the money thereby appropriated, and that by a strict adherence to this
principle an important and much-needed reform will be
accomplished.”167 President Hayes emphasized that policy riders
“invite[] attacks upon the independence and constitutional powers of the
Executive by providing an easy and effective way of constraining
Executive discretion.”168 In 1945, President Harry Truman stated that
“Congress has acted contrary to its own declared position, and has
attempted to effect a far-reaching change in the organization of the
Executive Branch” and that substantive legislation “should not be dealt
with as riders to appropriations bills.”169 In 1987, President Ronald
Reagan, when signing an appropriation bill, stated:
Article II of the Constitution assigns responsibility for
executing the law to the President. While the Congress is
empowered to enact new or different laws, it may not
indirectly interpret and implement existing laws, which is an
essential function allocated by the Constitution to the
executive branch. If the Congress disagrees with a statutory
interpretation advanced by the executive branch—or with the
efforts of the executive branch to defend or prosecute judicial
action based on that interpretation-the Congress may, of
course, amend the underlying statute. The use of an
appropriations bill for this purpose, however, is inconsistent
with the constitutional scheme of separation of powers.170
C. Normal Legislative Process Encourages Informed Deliberation
The normal legislative process provides ample opportunity for
Members of Congress to consider the subject matter of the proposed bill,
as well as public scrutiny, in the form of committee research and
recommendations, floor debates, and conference reports.171 In contrast,
appropriation riders receive very little, if any, deliberation and
167

President Rutherford B. Hayes, Veto of Appropriations Bill (May 4, 1880) (transcript
available at http://www. rbhayes.org/clientuploads/RBHSpeeches/speechrbh514.htm).
168
Id.
169
President Harry Truman, Veto of Bill Making Supplemental Appropriations for the
Federal Security Agency (Jul. 15, 1948) (transcript available at https://trumanlibrary.org/
publicpapers/viewpapers.php?pid=1681) (Truman also stated that the “legislation, which is
of such paramount importance to the interests of millions of wage earners and employers, and
which is plainly substantive in nature, was passed by the Congress entirely without reference
to or hearings by the legislative committees concerned with such matters. Neither the House
Committee on Education and Labor nor the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare
was given an opportunity to consider the measure. Instead it was conceived by a subcommittee
on appropriations and tacked onto an appropriations bill.”).
170
President Ronald Reagan, Statement on Signing H.R. 1827 into Law (Jul. 11, 1987)
(transcript available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=34542) (emphasis added).
171
The Legislative Process, CONGRESS.ORG, http://congress.org/advocacy-101/thelegislative-process/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2017).
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specifically prevent any public involvement or informed legislative
debate. Policy riders are often attached to must-pass spending legislation,
which forces the President to accept the riders or face the possibility of a
government shut-down.
Significantly, there is a substantial difference between the normal
legislative process and the introduction of a policy rider into an
appropriation bill or continuing resolution. In the chart below, the lack
of deliberation and transparency often seen when policy riders are
attached to must-pass spending legislation, is illustrated:
Normal Legislative Process
Policy Rider Process
Bill Drafted
Policy Rider Drafted
Bill Referred to Committee and
Subcommittee for Study and
Hearings
Bill
“Marked
Up”
by
Subcommittee
Subcommittee Vote
Bill Reviewed by Full Committee
(Further Study and Hearings
Possible)
Full Committee Vote
Publication of Written Report on
Bill
Floor Action Scheduled on Bill
Bill Debated on Floor
Bill Voted on in Chamber
Bill Referred to Other Chamber
(Generally Follows Same Route
Through Committee and Floor
Action)
Bill Sent to Conference (Both Policy Rider Slipped Into
House and Senate Must Approve Appropriations Bill / Continuing
Conference Report)
Resolution
Bill Sent to President
Appropriations Bill / Continuing
Resolution Sent to President
(Includes Policy Riders)
D. Policy Riders Negate Public Notice and Comment
Policy riders that are attached to basic legislation, and thus force the
President to sign the bill into law, negate any public comment received
throughout the rulemaking process. Under the Administrative Procedure

NELSON

2017]

2017

UNFAITHFUL EXECUTION OF THE LAW

121

Act (“APA”), when conducting informal rulemaking, administrative
agencies are required to provide the public with adequate notice of a
proposed rule followed by a meaningful opportunity to comment on the
rule’s content.172 Additionally, for matters of “great” importance, the
APA requires the agency to allow for “more elaborate public
procedures.”173 It would be nonsensical then for Congress to mandate the
public’s participation in the rulemaking process, but then later negate that
important participation.
The DOL “fiduciary” rulemaking,174 discussed earlier in this Article,
provides a good example of the importance of public participation. The
DOL provided an extraordinarily lengthy and transparent notice and
comment process, which included more than 160 days of open public
comment, over 3,000 comment letters (including over 300,000 individual
comments), and four days of public hearings with seventy-five witnesses.
Throughout the comment process, Secretary of Labor Tom Perez and
DOL staff held hundreds of meetings with Members of Congress,
financial services firms and organizations, and consumer groups.
Members of Congress actively participated in the rulemaking
process. Over one hundred Members of Congress provided comment on
the DOL rulemaking.175 As noted above, Congressional participation in
the rulemaking process is encouraged—it is entirely proper for Members
of Congress to represent the interests of their constituents before
administrative agencies engaged in informal, general policy
rulemaking.176 This Article agrees that it was not unconstitutional for
Congress to participate in the rulemaking.
However, while participation in the comment process was
constitutional, the various attempts to stop the rulemaking process by
Members of Congress was unconstitutional. In December 2015,
lawmakers attempted to attach a rider to an omnibus spending bill that
would “require the Department of Labor to publish its fiduciary rule for
another comment period before finalizing the rule.”177 Additionally, in a
172

5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(c) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-90).
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, S. DOC. NO. 248, at 259
(1946).
174
Department of Labor, Definition of the Term “Fiduciary:” Conflict of Interest Rule—
Retirement Investment Advice, 81 Fed. Reg. 20,946 (Apr. 8, 2016) (29 C.F.R. Pts. 2509,
2510, 2550); Department of Labor, Best Interest Contract Exemption, 81 Fed. Reg. 21,002
(Apr. 8, 2016) (29 C.F.R. Pt. 2550).
175
Employee Benefits Security Administration, Comments on Conflict of Interest
Proposed Rule, https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/laws-and-regulations/rules-andregulations/public-comments/1210-AB32-2 (last visited Dec. 27, 2017).
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Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 409-10 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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Melanie Waddell, Spending Bill Rider Would Delay DOL Fiduciary Rule by Adding
Comment Period, THINKADVISOR (Dec. 7, 2015), http://www.thinkadvisor.com/2015/12/07/
173

NELSON

122

2017

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

[Vol. 42:1

November 2016 letter, Senator Ron Johnson advised the DOL that
implementation of the fiduciary rule should be halted, because the
regulation “will very likely be rescinded.”178 The proposed policy rider
and action requested in the letter would have violated the separation of
powers by having the legislature interfere with the execution of the law,
i.e., conducting a rulemaking to implement a statute, in this case ERISA.
As noted above, “[i]nterpreting a law enacted by Congress to implement
the legislative mandate is the very essence of ‘execution’ of the law.”179
Congress, by using a policy rider to repeal or delay the rule, would
be negating the voices of hundreds of thousands of individuals who
participated in the rulemaking process. Interestingly, they will also be
negating the voices of those Members of Congress who participated in
the rulemaking process. This Article submits that the Constitution should
not allow one Member of Congress to negate the voices of hundreds of
thousands of American citizens by simply attaching a policy rider to a
piece of legislation.180
VI. CASE STUDIES
Stand-alone legislation directing agency action may also violate the
Constitution. While this Article focuses on policy riders attached to
appropriation bills, and these bills are currently stand-alone pieces of
legislation, they could be added to a future appropriations bill.181
A. Retail Investor Protection Act (H.R. 1090)
In February 2015, Representative Ann Wagner, who represents
Missouri’s 2nd District,182 introduced the Retail Investor Protection Act
spending-bill-rider-would-delay-dol-fiduciary-rule.
178
Letter from Ron Johnson, Sen. from Wisconsin, to Tom Perez, Dep’t of Labor Sec’y
(Nov. 22, 2016), http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/chairman-johnson-letter-to-dol-onfiduciary-rule.
179
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 733 (1986).
180
“[I]t is proper you should understand what I deem the essential principles of our
Government, and consequently those which ought to shape its Administration . . . [such as]
the diffusion of information and arraignment of all abuses at the bar of the public reason . . . .”
President Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1801) (transcript available at
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/jefinau1.asp).
181
Sen. Mike Lee, Restoring Congressional Accountability Through Appropriations
Process, THE DAILY SIGNAL (May 2, 2016), http://dailysignal.com/2016/05/02/restoringcongressional-accountability-through-appropriations-process/ (“As Congress proceeds
through the appropriations process this Spring, each spending bill presents an opportunity to
advance structural reforms that would restore congressional accountability over federal
regulations.”).
182
Press Release, Rep. Ann Wagner, Rep. Wagner Statement on the Introduction of the
Retail Investor Protection Act (Feb. 25, 2015), https://wagner.house.gov/media-center/pressreleases/rep-wagner-statement-on-the-introduction-of-the-retail-investor (last visited Dec.
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(“RIPA”).183 RIPA would prohibit the DOL from implementing its
fiduciary rule until sixty days after the Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”) issues a final rule governing standards of conduct
for brokers and dealers under specified law.184 RIPA amends sections of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;185 however, this Article will focus
on the section concerning the DOL fiduciary rule.
RIPA, if enacted, would violate the Constitution. First, it is unlawful
under current Supreme Court precedent. In Sierra Club, the Supreme
Court held that Congressional interference could be unlawful if the
“content of the pressure on the [decisionmaker] is designed to force him
to decide upon factors not made relevant by Congress in the applicable
statute” and also that the determination made “must be affected by those
extraneous considerations.”186
Following the Supreme Court’s
reasoning, in ATX, Inc. v. United States Department of Transportation,
the DC Circuit held that “an administrative decision must be based
‘strictly on the merits and completely without regard to any
considerations not made relevant by Congress in the applicable
statutes.’”187 RIPA would force the DOL to base its implementation of
the fiduciary rule on the actions of another government agency (“SEC”),
rather than the applicable factors under ERISA. These factors include,
but are not limited to, increasing “the likelihood that participants and
beneficiaries under single-employer defined benefit pension plans will
receive their full benefits.”188
Second, RIPA violates the separation of powers under the
Constitution. Forcing the DOL to stop implementation of its fiduciary
rule,189 which has the force of law,190 effectively removes DOL’s ability
to faithfully execute the laws under the Constitution. It is important to
note that RIPA does not amend the underlying ERISA statute, but rather
27, 2017).
183
Retail Investor Protection Act, H.R. 1090, 114th Cong. (2015).
184
H.R. 1090, 114th Cong. § 2.
185
15 U.S.C. § 78 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-90).
186
Sierra Club, 657 F.2d at 409-10.
187
ATX, Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Transp., 41 F.3d 1522, 1530 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(quoting D. C. Fed’n of Civic Ass’ns v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 1231, 1246 (D.C. Cir. 1971)).
188
29 U.S.C. § 1001b(c)(3) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-90).
189
See Springer v. Gov’t of Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 202 (1928); see also J.W.
Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928).
190
New York v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57, 63 (1988) (“The Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution gives force to federal action of this kind by stating that ‘the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance’ of the Constitution ‘shall be the supreme Law of
the Land.’ U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2. The phrase ‘Laws of the United States’ encompasses
both federal statutes themselves and federal regulations that are properly adopted in
accordance with statutory authorization.”).
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it directs DOL to not implement a properly created federal law.
B. Protecting American Families’ Retirement Advice Act (H.R.
355)
In January 2017, Representative Joe Wilson, who represents South
Carolina’s 2nd District,191 introduced the Protecting American Families’
Retirement Advice Act (H.R. 355).192 The Act would require the DOL
to delay the effective date of its fiduciary rule for two years from the date
of the legislation.
The Act violates the separation of powers under the Constitution.
Forcing the DOL to stop implementation of its fiduciary rule, 193 which
has the force of law,194 effectively removes DOL’s ability to faithfully
execute the laws under the Constitution. Significantly, similar to RIPA,
the Act does not amend the underlying ERISA statute, but it does direct
DOL to not implement a properly created federal law.
C. Require Evaluation before Implementing Executive Wishlists
Act (H.R. 3438)
In September 2016, Representative Tom Marino, who represents
Pennsylvania’s 10th District,195 introduced the Require Evaluation before
Implementing Executive Wishlists Act of 2016 (“REVIEW Act”) (H.R.
3438).196 The REVIEW Act would require agencies to postpone the
effective date of high-impact rules ($1 billion impact on the economy)
until the final disposition of all actions seeking judicial review of the
rule.197
The REVIEW Act would illegally interfere with the President’s
constitutional duty to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed.” 198
It effectively stops an administrative agency from implementing a
regulation until any litigation brought against the agency with respect to

Press Release, Rep. Joe Wilson, Wilson Introduces the Protecting American Families’
Retirement Advice Act (Jan. 6, 2017), https://joewilson.house/gov/media-center/pressreleases/wilson-introduces-the-protecting-american-families-retirement-advice-act.
192
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193
See Springer, 277 U.S. at 202; see also Hampton, 276 U.S. at 406.
194
New York, 486 U.S. at 63.
195
Press Release, Rep. Tom Marino, Reps. Marino, Goodlatte Applaud Committee
Passage of Bill to Stop “High Impact” Regulations (Sept. 8, 2016), https://marino.house.gov/
media-center/press-releases/reps-marino-goodlatte-applaud-committee-passage-bill-stophigh-impact.
196
Require Evaluation before Implementing Executive Wishlists Act, H.R. 3438, 114th
Cong. (2016).
197
H.R. 3438 § 3.
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the rulemaking has concluded. In Bowsher, the Supreme Court ruled that
Congress may not, “in practical terms, reserve . . . control over the
execution of the laws.”199 By not allowing agencies to implement rules
in a timely fashion, this is exactly what the REVIEW Act allows
Congress to do.
D. Regulations from the Executive in Need of Scrutiny Act (H.R.
427)
In July 2015, now Senator Todd Young, who at the time was a
Congressman representing Indiana’s 9th District, introduced the
Regulations from the Executive in Need of Scrutiny Act (“REINS
Act”).200 The REINS Act would require “a joint resolution of approval
of major rules to be enacted before such rules may take effect” and that
“if a joint resolution of approval is not enacted by the end of 70 session
days or legislative days, as applicable, after the agency proposing the rule
submits its report on such rule to Congress, the major rule shall be
deemed not to be approved and shall not take effect.”201
The REINS Act would impermissibly interfere with the President’s
constitutional duty to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed.” 202
It effectively allows Congress, the branch that creates laws, to also
control the execution of those laws. As noted in Chadha, “Congress must
abide by its delegation of authority until that delegation is altered or
revoked.”203 In Bowsher, the Supreme Court ruled that Congress may
not, “in practical terms, reserve . . . control over the execution of the
laws.”204 Unfortunately, this is exactly what the REINS Act would
accomplish.
VII. SOLUTIONS
A. Enforce Congressional Rules
The simplest solution to the use of appropriation riders is for
Congress to enforce their own rules and not allow Members of Congress
to waive the rules concerning the attachment of substantive legislation to
appropriation bills. As noted above, legislating through appropriation
riders violates both Senate and House rules—generally legislative
199

Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 715 (1986).
Regulations from the Executive in Need of Scrutiny Act, H.R. 427, 114th Cong.
(2015).
201
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202
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203
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204
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provisions may not be included in appropriation bills.205
This Article proposes two methods for handling policy riders. The
first is to draft legislation that would codify the current Congressional
guidance with respect to legislating in appropriation bills and remove
Congress’ authority to waive those rules. The second would be to draft
legislation that would mandate greater transparency in the appropriations
process with respect to the addition of policy riders. While this Article
submits that many policy riders are unconstitutional, politically it will be
very difficult to ban this practice entirely.
Option 1: Prohibiting Policy Riders
AN ACT
To amend chapter 43 of title 2, United States Code, to provide
that substantive policy riders may not be attached to
appropriations bills and/or continuing resolutions.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SEC. 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the “Removing Policy Riders from
the Appropriations Process Act of 2017”.
SEC. 2. PURPOSE.
The purpose of this Act is to increase accountability in the
appropriations process. Section 3 of article 2 of the United
States Constitution mandates that the President shall ensure
faithful execution of the laws passed by the legislature. Over
time, Congress has consistently intruded upon this executive
branch authority by attaching policy riders to appropriations
bills that interfere with the executive’s power to interpret and
execute laws passed by Congress. In effect, Congress has
acquired control over the execution of the laws. By removing
Congress’s ability to attach policy riders to appropriations
bills that would interfere with executive enforcement of the
law, the Act will result in an improved regulatory process,
and a legislative branch that is truly accountable to the
American people for the laws imposed upon them.
SEC. 3. REMOVING POLICY RIDERS FROM THE
APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS.
Chapter 43 of title 2, United States Code, is amended to read
as follows:
CHAPTER 43—CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES
Sec. 4304. Prohibition on Substantive Limitation Policy
205

Deschler’s Precedents, vol. 8, chapter 26, § 24.

NELSON

2017]

2017

UNFAITHFUL EXECUTION OF THE LAW

127

Riders in Appropriations Bills.
Legislative provisions containing language that place
substantive limitations on agencies’ implementation of
statutory law and interferes with the execution of statutory
law in the appropriations process are prohibited from being
reported in general appropriations bills and amendments to
appropriations bills.
4305. Prohibition on Substantive Limitation Policy Riders in
Continuing Resolutions.
Legislative provisions containing language that places
substantive limitations on agencies’ implementation of
statutory law and interferes with the execution of statutory
law are prohibited from being reported in a continuing
resolution.
Option 2: Increasing Transparency in the Appropriations Process
AN ACT
To amend chapter 43 of title 2, United States Code, to
increase transparency with respect to substantive policy
riders attached to appropriations bills and/or continuing
resolutions.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the “Increasing Transparency in the
Appropriations Process Act of 2017”.
SECTION 2. PURPOSE.
The purpose of this Act is to increase transparency in the
appropriations process. Section 3 of article 2 of the United
States Constitution mandates that the President shall ensure
faithful execution of the laws passed by the legislature. Over
time, Congress has consistently intruded upon this executive
branch authority by attaching policy riders to appropriations
bills that interfere with the executive’s power to interpret and
execute laws passed by Congress. In effect, Congress has
acquired control over the execution of the laws. By requiring
Congress to be more transparent with respect to policy riders,
the Act will result in a legislative branch that is truly
accountable to the American people for the laws imposed
upon them.
SEC. 3. INCREASING TRANSPARENCY IN THE
APPROPRIATION PROCESS.
Chapter 43 of title 2, United States Code, is amended to read
as follows:
CHAPTER 43—CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES
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Sec. 4304. Increasing Transparency for Policy Riders in
Appropriations Bills.
(a) Appropriations Committee staff shall create a central
list of all policy riders included in an appropriations
bill. The list shall:
(1) include a section describing the purpose and
intent of each rider, along with the expected
impact on taxpayers and the economy;
(2) be made available to the public in a machine
readable format in advance of any vote on the
appropriations bill.
(b) Appropriations Committee staff shall highlight the
policy riders in the text of the appropriations bill so
interested parties can easily find the language in the
bill.
4305. Increasing Transparency for Policy Riders in
Continuing Resolutions.
(a) Appropriations Committee staff shall create a central
list of all policy riders included in a continuing
resolution. The list shall:
(1) include a section describing the purpose and
intent of each rider, along with the expected
impact on taxpayers and the economy;
(2) be made available to the public in a machine
readable format in advance of any vote on the
continuing resolution.
(b) Appropriations Committee staff shall highlight the
policy riders in the text of the continuing resolution
so interested parties can easily find the language in
the bill.
B. Limited Line Item Veto
Congress could create legislation that would allow for a line item
veto limited to policy riders in appropriation bills or continuing
resolutions. This legislation would allow: (1) policy riders to be attached
to appropriation bills and continuing resolutions; (2) President to veto
individual policy riders without having to veto the entire spending bill;
and (3) Congress to override the individual veto. This is a policy proposal
advanced by the non-profit group No Labels.206
206

Understanding the Line-Item Veto with a Twist, NO LABELS, https://www.nolabels.org
/understanding-the-line-item-veto-with-a-twist/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2017).
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In Clinton v. City of New York, the “Supreme Court found that the
line-item veto violated the Presentment Clause of the Constitution, which
says that the president does not have the power to unilaterally amend or
repeal legislation passed by Congress.”207 However, No Labels contends,
and this Article agrees, by sending the rescinded part of the bill back to
Congress for an expedited up or down vote, a limited line item veto
complies with the Presentment Clause of the Constitution and the
Supreme Court’s ruling in Clinton.208
This procedure would allow the President to separate controversial
policy riders from must-pass spending legislation, and would also
provide Congress with the ability to move forward by overriding the
President’s veto with respect to individual policy riders.
In 2006, Representative Paul Ryan introduced similar legislation
known as the Legislative Line Item Veto Act of 2006.209 This bill would
have authorized “the President to propose the cancellation (line item veto)
of any dollar amount of discretionary budget authority, item of direct
spending, or targeted tax benefit within 45 days after its enactment.”210
The bill passed the House, but was not considered in the Senate. While
this bill is similar, this Article contends that the No Labels proposal is
more appropriate.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Congress has slowly increased its control over the activities of the
executive branch, through directly influencing administrative
proceedings and through the use of substantive policy riders in the
appropriations process.
In sum and substance, Congress has
unconstitutionally acquired control over the execution of laws. This
Article submits that these actions are unconstitutional and must be
challenged. Over two hundred years ago, George Mason, then a delegate
to the United States Constitutional Convention of 1787, issued a warning
regarding “the practice of tacking foreign matter[s] to money bills.” 211
Today, this concern is even greater, with Congress freely adding policy
riders to appropriation bills, many of which receive little to no debate or
public scrutiny. This practice must be prohibited, or in the alternative, it
must be more transparent.
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